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Interaction:  A Case for Ontological Pluralism* 




Philosophers of biology have recently been worried about the question:  what is a 
biological individual?  This worry is prompted by the new salience of the microbiome in biology 
and medicine.  How should we conceptualize the relationship between individual organisms like 
birds or mammals and the microscale life forms – millions of bacteria – that inhabit their bodies 
and perform functions necessary for their survival?  Are those life forms biological individuals? 
Or does their dependence on a host make them something less than a full-fledged individual?  
But, if the host bodies are equally dependent on the microbiome, in what sense could they count 
as individuals?  How should we then define full-fledged individuality in order to encompass 
those entities we want to include and those we want to exclude?  C. K. Waters takes the pluralist-
pragmatist view, arguing that we should not ask what biological individuals are, but how the 
concept is deployed, what work it does, in different biological contexts (Waters 2018).  There is 
not one thing that biological individuals are, but different contexts require different distinctions 
and boundaries.  But there is another question we might ask:  why do we care about defining 
individuality in a metaphysically robust way?  This is a question that deserves a genealogical 
answer:  how did individuality come to play such a key role in our various analytical endeavors?  
Put differently: why do individuals, their behavior, and their properties constitute the subject 
matter of our investigations?   
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In this essay, I intend to motivate this question somewhat, rather than answer it directly. 
My aim is to show how a focus on individuals in some areas of analysis unwarrantedly limits the 
scope of investigation in those areas.  Most often, when individualism is under critique, the 
alternative is presumed to be group level analysis.  Are groups as real as the individuals that 
constitute them?  Are all groups simply aggregations of individuals, and all group properties, 
simply aggregates of individual properties?  These, too, are questions I don’t intend to answer.  
Instead, I want to draw attention to another ontological domain altogether: the process or event 
domain, focusing particularly on interaction.  My contention is that interactions should play as 
fundamental a role in analysis and investigation as individuals and their states and properties do.  
This essay is, then, a plea for ontological pluralism. 
My strategy is to first explain what I mean by ontological pluralism and propose a 
minimal criterion for inclusion of a category in our ontology.†  Then I will discuss two contexts 
in my own (philosophical) research where giving interactions the same status as individuals 
increases the scope of investigation.  Following this, I will draw attention to some areas in 
natural science where interactions meet the criterion I have specified.  Here I draw on and am 
inspired by work of Evelyn Keller.  I will conclude by suggesting the advantages of the kind of 
ontological pluralism I am advocating. 
1.  Some considerations about ontology. 
We might mean at least two things by ontological pluralism:  a plurality of ontologies or 
an ontology that is not driven by reductionist or unificationist aims.  My interest is really the 
second of these.  It might be better termed “ecumenical ontology.”  Rather than trying to identify 
what is really real (to which any other purported kind of thing can be reduced), an ecumenical 
 
† I am neither a metaphysician nor an ontologist.  My thinking here draws on my studies of scientific inquiry and 
reasoning. 
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ontology will be characterized by a criterion that can be satisfied by different kinds of thing.  The 
tricks are first to articulate a defensible criterion and then to think about what satisfies it.  If there 
are multiple defensible criteria that are not versions of or reducible to a single criterion, they 
would give rise to a plurality of ontologies.  As I will not try to argue that the criterion I 
articulate is the only proper criterion, I am obviously open to ontological pluralism in the first 
sense as well. 
Philosophy of science was (and in some quarters still is) riven by debates about scientific 
realism.  These debates can occur in two registers.  In one the question is: do the unobservable, 
unmeasurable entities referred to in scientific theories exist (or really exist)?  In the other, the 
question is: can we know that the unobservable, unmeasurable entities referred to in our theories 
really exist?  In the first register we must make a judgment about the reality of things like muons, 
electrons, genes; in the second, we need make no judgment about their reality, only about our 
access to those entities should they exist.  The important point here is that both ways of asking 
about theoretical entities presuppose that there is a set of entities or phenomena about which we 
can say that they do exist.  These are measured or observed phenomena whose properties and 
behaviors we are investigating and explaining by means of theories that appeal to unobserved or 
unmeasured phenomena.  This may smack a little too much of the discredited observable-
unobservable distinction of the 1950s.  The point is that at any given time, there are phenomena 
whose properties, relations, and behaviors we can  (or take ourselves to be able to) identify and 
measure.  We take those as real phenomena that we then need to explain.  Sometimes the 
explanations are in terms of other measurable properties, but sometimes we (or the researchers 
actually performing the investigations) postulate other phenomena whose properties, etc. we 
can’t directly measure, such as protons, genes, gravitational waves, etc.  Their postulated 
 4 
properties and behavior would explain the phenomena in which we are interested if the 
postulations were true, but our only access to them is through the phenomena we are trying to 
explain or predict.   
The questions about scientific realism can be understood as asking whether the items that 
feature in scientific theories have the same ontological status as the items they are invoked to 
explain.  This suggests a criterion:  that is real that i) can be measured (counted, assigned values 
in dimensions such as length, volume, weight, …), and ii) is treated as an explanandum in some 
scientific investigation. Note that this is merely a sufficient condition.  It is not a necessary 
condition, or at least I am not arguing so.  My contention is that this criterion can be satisfied by 
different kinds of phenomena. 
Why is it even worth making such a claim?  The response brings us to another major 
question in recent philosophy of science: reduction and reducibility.  This debate, too, has been 
conducted in both an ontological and a representational/epistemological register.  Ontologically, 
the question is whether all phenomena can be understood as decomposable without remainder 
into aggregations of units which constitute the fundamental level of reality.  
Epistemologically/representationally, the question is whether our theories can all be organized 
into a single overarching theory with many derivations, for example, a fundamental physical 
theory from which biology, chemistry and all other theories can with suitable auxiliaries be 
derived.  So, again there is a presupposition that there is some level of being whose reality is not 
in question, and against which all other candidates for that status must be compared.  But it is not 
clear what (in the reducibility debate) qualifies anything for that status beyond being non-
decomposable. So, the criterion would be X is real if X is not exhaustively decomposable into 
parts.  If one takes the long view, however, decomposability seems to be as much a function of 
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theories and instruments, i.e., the tools of investigation, as of reality itself. What was non-
decomposable one hundred years ago is now fractured into multiple constituent parts.  In the 
reducibility debate, the question is whether only one kind of thing can be real or whether 
multiple kinds of thing can be real, e.g. parts and wholes, atoms and molecules, molecules and 
organisms, etc. For the advocate of reduction, only one of each pair is a candidate for reality, and 
to the extent it is decomposable, its reality status is in doubt.  As long as reducibility is a 
defensible ideal, it is not obvious that more than one kind of thing can satisfy a reality criterion.    
Interestingly, the reality granting ground of reduction and decomposition is opposite to 
that of explanation.  Reality ends up at different ends of a continuum or on opposite sides of a 
dichotomy in contexts of explanation and contexts of reducibility: postulated fundamental 
entities whose behavior drives and explains all else for reduction and the measured and observed 
that is explained for explanation..  But in both cases, from a metaphysical point of view, the 
debates seem to be about the same kind of phenomenon: individual entities (whether compound 
or atomic) and their properties.  There is a kind of self-evidence about the presumed ontological 
priority of individuals.  Our world seems composed of individual entities, whether atoms, people, 
or tables, and their properties.  These are the items about whose ontological status we care.  But 
perhaps this is only because we are ideologically primed to perceive the world in this way either 
by metaphysical commitment or by language.  In social science, there is a debate about the 
reality of groups over and above their members.  This debate seems to be asking whether we can 
grant to groups the same kind of properties we grant to the members of groups.  And this 
question seems equivalent (or nearly so) to asking whether groups of individuals are themselves 
individuals.  I want to argue for the inclusion not of different kinds of individual into our 
ontology, but of members of a different metaphysical category altogether: interactions.  The 
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ground for such inclusion is that interactions satisfy both criteria of reality articulated above, that 
is, whether one is using empiricist criteria of measurability and eligibility for explanation, or the 
more metaphysical criterion of non-decomposability, interactions (at least some) count as real. 
I will make the case for interactions first by drawing on some recent work of mine in 
epistemology and on social behavior and then by drawing attention to interactions of various 
kinds in some natural sciences.  Here the point is, first, to show that individualist thinking is 
constricting, and, secondly, to show that interactions do satisfy the reality criterion. I then want 
to connect these discussions to some of Keller’s points about language and science (Keller this 
volume; 1995) .  Here, the point is to give the concept of interaction some philosophical heft. 
2.  Two contexts 
a. Social Epistemology 
In epistemology, the individual cognitive agent and his/her doxastic states have been the 
traditional focus of analysis.  The prototypical analysand in contemporary epistemology has been 
the statement: “S knows that p.”  This is in turn understood as involving some or all of belief on 
the part of S, truth of p, and justification of S’s belief that p.  Each of these is the subject of 
intensive debate.  No matter how these components of the assertion are understood, the focal 
situation remains the individual and their relation to what they believe.  Recently epistemology 
has moved to include social questions, considering the individual cognitive agent in social 
relations: Alvin Goldman’s aptly titled, “Knowledge in a Social World” exemplifies this turn 
(Goldman 1999). Phenomena like testimony, disagreement, deference to experts involve at least 
two individuals.  In most of this new literature they are approached from the individual’s 
perspective:  should I/you believe S; what should be my attitude/response to disagreement? 
When is deference to experts warranted?  How do I tell if an expert is genuine?  How do I choose 
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between experts who disagree?  These are the new epistemological questions for the individual 
when their world includes more than the non-social phenomena more standardly presupposed in 
epistemological set-ups.  And, they constitute the subject matter of much social epistemology.  
But this approach reveals a crucial oversight of traditional epistemology.   
Consider disagreement: From the point of view of the traditional, individual cognitive 
agent centered epistemology, disagreement among peers poses a problem.  Many, if not most, 
writers frame the problem in the first person or in the voice of an individual cognitive agent who 
believes her or himself to know, or at least to have a (well-) justified belief, that p.  The framing 
of the problem is from the point of view of S in “S knows that p.”  What do I or what does S do 
when, believing ourselves to be justified in our belief (or in having a high degree of credence in 
p), we encounter disagreement from one whom we take to be an epistemic peer?  Why should 
disagreement be a problem?  If an epistemic peer is one with the same data and equal epistemic 
competence (equal perceptual and reasoning powers), then the peer’s disagreement seems to be 
evidence that my or the original agent’s reasons do not support p (or the degree of credence 
invested in p.  But I believed myself to have good, even decisive, reasons for p.  The task of the 
epistemologist is taken to be to solve this problem for the agent by recommending a course of 
action.   
The epistemologists engaged in these discussions tell us how disagreement should affect 
the individual’s accumulation of evidence relevant to p, in ways that preserve the legitimacy of 
the individual’s self-trust.  Indeed the point of the discussion seems to be to identify forensic 
resources available to the individual for rational incorporation of the experience of disagreement 
back in the smooth cognitive flow.  The difference among the philosophers lies in the precise 
strategies of incorporation that are articulated in each philosopher’s preferred epistemological 
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framework.  In spite of differences in framework, they seem to share an assumption about 
evidence – that it is monotonic:  if e is evidence for p, it is not evidence for q where p if and only 
if not-q – and they seem to be in agreement that the solution involves moving to an 
epistemological or cognitive metalevel, whether evidence about evidence, explanation of 
disagreement, beliefs about reliability.  The assumption about the monotonicity of evidence 
makes the phenomenon of disagreement a problem for epistemology.  How can two epistemic 
peers, that is, equals in cognitive abilities, disagree when in possession of the same facts? 
Philosophers of science have long known that two or more equivalently informed and 
reasonable researchers can disagree about the evidential import of the same observable 
phenomena, the same facts.  Pierre Duhem, Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend all provided 
illustrations from the history of science (though they disagreed in their diagnoses).  But whether 
diagnosed as underdetermination or theory-ladenness, this feature of the practice of science 
reveals how the attribution of evidential status to data is a community level practice.  
Researchers must agree that a given phenomenon is evidence that such and such a state of affairs 
obtains. Philosophers disagree about the means of such agreement.  I have argued that that 
agreement is achieved through interaction – critical discursive interaction among the members of 
the research community that sifts through conflicting readings of the data and eventually 
stabilizes (or rejects) their evidential import.  In a forthcoming paper (Longino n.d.), I argue that 
most approaches in social epistemology take the basic questions of epistemology to be 
articulated and answered at the individual level.  But for the most part, epistemology conducted 
at that level takes for granted that we know what evidence is.  A serious look at the history and 
practice of science calls this presupposition into doubt, arguing that there can be reasonable 
differences as to how to characterize the measurable, observable aspects of the domain one is 
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investigating, and reasonable differences as to what hypotheses are supported by observations 
about whose characterization researchers agree.  That is, how to characterize candidates for 
evidential status and how to characterize evidential status itself are matters to which there is no a 
priori access and which must be settled by the community in order for research to go forward.  
These are matters settled through the critical interaction among members of the research 
community, matters that can change with changes in instrumentation, representational resources, 
personnel, etc.  A social epistemology that limits its purview to individual actions and practices 
leaves crucial questions, like how evidence gets to be evidence, unanswered. 
b. Social behavior 
In some of the most prominent approaches in behavioral science (classical and molecular 
genetics of behavior, neurobiology, social-environment oriented research) the focus is also on 
individual organisms.  And, in the sciences of human behavior it is, of course, on human 
individuals.  Behavioral science is focused on variation, how do individuals come to vary in 
individual properties and propensities.  Different research methods permit different specific 
questions and hypotheses.  They might all share an interest in the question: Why do individuals 
in a given population vary in their expression of some behavior B?   Behavior genetics 
approaches this question by asking:   To what extent can variation in B in population P be 
attributed to genetic variation and to what extent is it attributable to environmental variation?  It 
has developed specific methods to answer this question.  Neurophysiology addresses it by 
tracking correlations between specific neural states identified through various technologies and 
behavioral states, and trying to rule out neural alternatives that might play a role in the 
behavioral variation.  The methods in these and other approaches (socio-environmental, 
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molecular genetics, integrative efforts) are drawn from methods for studying similarity and 
variation in non-behavioral properties, like eye color or height, cognitive abilities.     
Many of the behaviors studied in behavioral sciences, however, are not purely individual, 
in the sense of self-concerning behaviors such as brushing one’s teeth, but behaviors involving 
other individuals.  They are treated as the individual’s behavior with or directed towards others.  
So, social phenomena like aggression or sexual behavior, which generally involve two or more 
persons are studied as individual traits:  What factors, genetic, neurological, physiological, 
social, impact the disposition to react aggressively to situations?  What factors impact choice of 
sexual partner or activity?  These social behaviors, then, are studied as the properties of 
individuals are studied.  But, there are questions that cannot be answered by looking only or 
primarily at the properties of the individuals involved in a given social behavior.  Consider 
differences in the frequency, timing, or distribution of a social behavior in two or more 
geographically separated populations constituted of biologically similar individuals.  We could 
be asking about problematic behaviors like violent aggression or pro-social behaviors like 
grooming.  What is of interest are the differences between the populations, and as I and others 
have argued, these questions cannot be answered by looking only to the differences among the 
individuals constituting the populations (Longino 2013, 2019).  What we really want to know is 
what explains the difference in frequency, etc, of certain interactions, not why individuals engage 
in those interactions.  The latter continues to be a reasonable object of research.  It is just not the 
only kind of research question prompted by social behaviors.  We can more readily see the full 
range of questions when we look at the social behaviors as interactions, rather than as 
expressions of individual dispositions.  
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In treating social behavior as interaction, behavior is in an important sense depersonalized.  
We are not asking why individuals do what they do, but what conditions facilitate or obstruct the 
occurrence of certain interactions, independently of the features of the participants.   This 
approach to social behavior resembles approaches in ecology rather than genetics, neuroscience, 
or psychology.  But ecology, too, has been an arena of debate between individualist, reductionist 
approaches and non-individualist approaches.  It is incumbent on the advocate of interaction to 
look more closely at particular efforts in the life sciences where interaction is the more apt label 
for the phenomena under investigation. 
3.  Biology 
Social epistemology and study of social behavior are not the only areas of research where 
individualist bias has obscured features of phenomena under investigation.  Research in many 
areas of biology reveals the centrality of interactive phenomena to the existence, origin, and 
persistence of life forms.  Study of this research by historians and philosophers also reveals the 
difficulty researchers have in thinking of our world as composed of anything but individuals and 
the resistance to modes of analysis that seek explanations at levels other than factors internal to 
individuals. 
Evelyn Keller brought this to our attention forcefully in her analysis of the work of corn 
geneticist Barbara McClintock, her analysis of the work of Christine Nüsslein-Vollhart, and her 
own analysis of slime mold aggregation.  Let us think first about the latter.  Slime mold is a 
generic name for a family of organisms that exist in multiple forms.  In an early stage of her 
career, Keller was interested in using Turing diffusion equations as a way of understanding the 
general problem of development of differentiated structures from a genetically uniform system.  
Biologist Lee Segel brought the phenomenon known as slime mold aggregation to her attention.  
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Dictyostelium discoideum exists as a mass of single unicellular organisms until those cells come 
together to form organisms consisting of stalks and fruiting bodies. Together Keller and Segel  
developed mathematical tools for describing the transition of Dictyostelium. from one form to the 
other without postulating a genetic difference in some subset of cells (the “pacemakers”) that 
trigger and govern the movement (Keller and Segel 1970; Keller 1983a).  The prevailing view 
held that these cells have a genetic mutation that enables them to release the chemical, acrasin, 
thereby triggering the movement of other amoebic cells toward the releasing cell.  Instead Segel 
and Keller developed equations that could model the acrasin diffusion and slime mold 
aggregation as the outcome of an interaction among otherwise identical cells.  This interaction is 
a response to local changes in parameters that support the persistence of a steady state in a 
colony of uniformly distributed single-celled amoebae, primarily the exhaustion of a nutrient 
base.  Interestingly, although their work was not at the time widely adopted in the case of slime 
mold, a quick search of recent literature shows that the Keller-Segel model is itself an attractant, 
as researchers continue to adopt and adapt it to understand chemotaxis (chemically mediated 
intercellular interacton). 
Keller also drew attention to similar themes in the research of others.  Perhaps her 
biography of geneticist Barbara McClintock is the best known of these efforts (Keller 1983b).  
Here she showed how McClintock, by trying to understand differences in her samples (corn 
kernels on a cob, for example) developed models of the interaction among genes and between 
genes and their cellular and larger environments.  Keller was also drawn to the work of 
developmental biologist Christiane Nüsslein-Vollhardt, who studied gene-protein interactions in 
development, in particular gene-protein interactions in oocytes (Keller 2017; see also Keller 
199).  Thus, her work contributes to more general understanding of maternal effects in 
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development.   Nüsslein-Vollhardt performed pain-staking experiments showing that such 
features of Drosophila embryos as polarity (differentiation along the head-rear axis) and 
segmentation could be treated as the outcome of morphogen gradients (in this case, diffusion of 
the bcd protein).  These results were extended to other species and genera.   
Keller’s expository focus is demonstrating what can be gained by resistance to 
exclusively genetic explanations of phenotypic phenomena.  Her target is what she called the 
master-molecule approach to biological analysis, namely, the effort to attribute phenotypic 
differences to some governing entity characterized by a unique and stable genome, as suggested 
by a popularized version of what Francis Crick called the Central Dogma.  She saw this as, 
among other things, one expression of a masculinist androcentrism in science that perpetuates a 
conception of the world as divided between active and passive objects.  We might think of this as 
the use of metaphors drawn from the experience and point of view of those engaged in science 
(or those whose perspectives counted in the scientific community -- men) imbued with a sense of 
its correctness.  Keller saw this masculinist androcentrism also in then conventional ways of 
understanding scientific objectivity, famously distinguishing between static objectivity, 
characterized by a rigid orientation towards dominance of the object of understanding, and 
dynamic objectivity, characterized by the ability to move in and out of intimacy with the object 
of understanding (Keller 1996). There is a consistency in her thought: we need to accept that the 
world is complex and active and stop trying to shoehorn it into changeless forms.  This is not to 
abandon the effort to understand, still less to abandon the effort to represent relationships 
mathematically.  Rather it is a call for tools of analysis that are capable of expressing the 
complexity of the natural world. 
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If we reject the effort to attribute certain phenomena to the action of one agent, there are 
at least two alternatives.  One is to identify another agent, another molecule (a different gene) or 
perhaps an agent at a higher (or lower) level of organization, a protein (or an amino acid).  
Another is to look for multiple agents that somehow together account for the phenomenon one is 
trying to explain.  It is the character of that togetherness that interests me.  To say that the action 
of two or more factors is required for the manifestation of the phenomenon is not yet to say what 
kind of action.  It might be joint action, or coaction, or interaction.  These distinctions become 
salient when interaction per se is the focus of attention.  For the moment, I want to remind the 
reader of some other biological contexts in which interaction rather than single factor action is 
invoked. 
Perhaps the most infamous instance of ignoring other participants and possible 
interaction is the description of the process of fertilization in mammals.  Classically (and still in 
some text books) fertilization is a matter of an active, wriggling sperm cell (or many such cells) 
making its (or their) way up the vaginal canal until encountering a motionless, waiting egg.  The 
sperm then penetrates the egg and once inside, the two haplotypes merge into one cell and one 
full set of chromosomes, setting off the process of development.  For years observations of egg 
behavior were ignored by the broader research community.  Finally, the role of the egg’s cilia in 
selecting which sperm cell will enter the egg and in facilitating the sperm’s passage through the 
outer covering, the zona, of the egg, have been more widely recognized. The shift in perspective 
was clearly and wittily described by historian Emily Martin in her article, “The Egg and the 
Sperm: How Science Has Created a Romance Based on Stereotypical Male and Female Roles.”  
(Martin 1991)  Researchers nevertheless continued to find ways to describe the sperm’s role in 
the process as active in contrast to the passive role of the egg.  Freed of sexist (and individualist) 
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preoccupations, however, we can see the research on the egg showing that fertilization is not a 
process in which an active element acts on and transforms a passive element, but an interaction 
in which two elements act on each other in a process that culminates in fusion of the two cells 
and their genetic material.  Because the first  sperm to arrive is not necessarily the successful 
entrant, incorporating the egg’s participation in the process helps  make sense of aspects of 
fertilization that remain puzzling if the sperm cell is the only actor. 
Many other life processes are interactive processes, that is, processes in which two or 
more different kinds of entity combine in an ongoing or episodic way.   The various forms of 
symbiosis, which involves an exchange between two or more organisms that is beneficial to at 
least one of them, are the most familiar, but one can see other biological processes as interactive 
as well.  Thomas Pradeu has argued that biological individuals are “integrated wholes made up 
of heterogeneous constituents (including many microbes) that are locally interconnected by 
strong biochemical interactions and controlled at a systematic level by immunological 
interactions.” (Pradeu 2019, p. 25)  New research on the origin of life proposes that catalytic 
interactions among chemical constituents of the early prebiotic soup were the precursors of 
metabolism and that cyclic (that is, stably repeating) interactions of this kind gave rise to the 
metabolic processes that in turn gave rise to self-replicating molecules (Trefil, Morowitz, and 
Smith 2009). 
It would take more analysis of these kinds of case to fully explicate and support the idea 
that interaction is in some ways and in some instances as or more fundamental than individuals.  
Some of this argumentation is to be found in recent work of John Dupré, although his focus is on 
process rather than interaction specifically (Dupré 2012).  My contention, in any case, is that 
interaction is on a par with objects (individuals) ontologically speaking.  Here I want to return to 
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the general proposal for thinking of interactions as an ontological category and to bring that into 
conversation with Keller’s concerns with language and science  
4. Language and Reality 
Keller points to the dual function of metaphor as both helping to entrench ways of 
thinking and enabling novel ways of representing and understanding natural phenomena  (Keller, 
this volume).  Metaphors, especially the productive ones, do more than offer us visualizations of 
unvisualized phenomena; they express metaphysical commitments as well.  Keller has brought 
our attention to the representations of the gene and genome as stable directors of developmental 
processes, through the metaphoric language of gene action.  The language used to characterize 
the gene was an outcome of the need to reconcile two conflicting aspects of ascribed gene 
function:  serving as the stable atomic constituent of life and as (actively) directing development.  
Something truly stable does not change, something engaged in directing a process must change, 
i.e. do something, in the course of that action.  Keller suggests that language that obscured this 
distinction was important in facilitating research on genes and the genome.  I would like to 
propose that another reason that it was possible to embrace a language that papered over this 
apparent contradiction is that such contradictory entities have been at the center of western 
philosophy since the beginning.  Plato’s changeless forms that are the really real entities, 
Aristotle’s Prime, Unmoved Mover, various representations of the divinity conceived as the 
theos of monotheism, all embody this contradictory aspect.‡  So do the various conceptions of 
fundamental material particles, whether corpuscles, atoms, or elementary particles.   
A much more serious history of western philosophy and science would be required to 
fully explore these contentions.  Nevertheless, just a cursory survey of our systems of 
 
‡ Indeed, these are the worries raised in the great poem of Parmenides, whose interpretation continues to be a subject 
of debate.  See Palmer (2016).  
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representation shows that we tend to think in terms of independent self-contained agents acting 
on a receptive or passive object as that which is real and whose properties and capacities it is the 
task of science to describe and explain.    In questioning the self-evidence of this view, I don’t 
deny that individuals are real.  But this potted view of why they should figure exclusively in so 
many of our ontologies at least suggests that we might think twice before ontologically 
privileging them.  If Pradeu is right, after all, mammalian organisms maintain their distinct 
individuality through the interactions among multiple parts and systems.  Of course, the 
organism as a whole also interacts with its environment, but the interactions from the 
biochemical to the organic that hold the individual together distinguish the individual from its 
environment by the density and intensity of those interactions. 
My point is not to urge replacing an object-focused ontology with a process- or event-
focused ontology.  It is rather to urge that interactions be studied for their own sake, just as we 
study objects, individuals, and kinds of individuals.   Interactions invite both the scientific study 
of specific kinds of interaction and the philosophical study of interaction qua ontological 
category.  In biology, it has been common to posit the interaction of genes and environment to 
explain the development of phenotypic traits as well as the distribution of phenotypic traits.  This 
explanatory move has been seen as part of a more general resistance to reductionist tendencies in 
(and about) biology.  That is, a common direction of explanation of individual properties and 
differences among individuals is to move to the internal constituents of individual organisms: 
hormones or (ultimately) genes.  However, as long as interactions feature only in explanations, 
they will be subject to the vicissitudes of debates about scientific realism vs instrumentalism.  
What the examples I have mentioned show is that interactions can themselves be the target of 
explanations.  There are questions about interactions qua interactions.  Interactions do not figure 
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only in explanations.  As we begin to address differences in the distribution of phenomena 
among different populations, interactions themselves become the focus, not the individuals 
participating in them.  We may want to ask about the distribution of certain kinds of interaction, 
about their frequency, about the conditions that facilitate or hinder the occurrence of certain 
interactions.  In these kinds of inquiry, interactions are not posited as explanations of observed 
phenomena, but are themselves observed phenomena that can be counted and measured and 
whose characteristics can be explained.   
The ecumenical ontology I advocate is not driven by metaphysical concerns, but is a 
more bottom up enterprise.  What do we observe?  What questions do we have about what we 
observe?  Keller observes how genetic research has moved from representing the gene as a fixed, 
stable object to a system for reacting to signals received from the environment.  As a reactive 
system, though, it can no longer be understood in isolation.  It reacts to something.  And, I would 
suggest, in that moment of reaction, we could as easily see interaction as action.  As research 
develops it unveils complexities unconceived of in early phases of investigation.  In Keller’s 
account, research has moved from considering the gene in agential terms to considering it in 
interaction with various levels of its context.  We will always be constrained by the linguistic 
resources available, but natural languages are rich enough to offer alternative descriptive 
expressions than those favored in the mainstream.   One of our jobs as philosophers is to attend 
to the ways in which one formulation may have outlived its usefulness and to ask why it 
nevertheless persists.  Another is to consider the metaphysical and ontological commitments 
carried by the language we use.  We will not truly escape those commitments without an 
alternative formulation.   
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I suggest that the language of interaction has the potential to both generate interesting and 
fruitful scientific research and to avoid some of the problematic consequences of the exclusive 
language of individual objects.  I have argued that this is the case in social epistemology (and 
epistemology more generally) and in the study of social behavior.  A brief survey shows this is 
also the case in other areas of biology.  Philosophically filling out the concept of interaction may 
make that language more available.  This means distinguishing interactions from other kinds of 
events and processes and classifying them into various kinds: cooperative or competitive,  
mutualist or parasitic, episodic or continuous, statistical or causal, and so on.  For the moment, it 
must suffice to say that interactions are a kind of hybrid of process/event and object, as they 
involve objects/individuals exchanging energy in some form or other.   I see no reason to think 
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